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PHILOSOPHICAL AND PROCEDURAL 
EXCURSIONS INTO THE ARBITRATION 
WORLD OF PATENT AND COPYRIGHT 
DISPUTES 
Mary A. Bedikiant 
INTRODUCTION 
A distinguished jurist and legal scholar aptly remarked long ago, 
"[f]or most of the things that properly can be called evils in the 
present state of the law, I think the main remedy, as for the evils 
of public opinion, is for us to grow more civilized." So noted Jus-
tice Holmes before the Harvard Law School Association in 1913. 
The civilization of which he spoke was a sobering indictment of 
those whose cosmic visions oppilated the distinction between tran-
scending their convictions and espousing the orderly as opposed to 
the revolutionary change of the law. 
The attack on the American court system, which constituted the 
basis of his remarks, was hardly unique. There would always be, he 
said, those who were dissatisfied with the American system of ju-
risprudence, those who believed that justice was elusive and ineq-
uitable, and those who believed that the cherished systems of gov-
ernance were bordering on the brink of destruction because social 
goals, as advanced by the application of law in the court system, 
were devoid of equilibrium. 
This tide of discontent, which often breeds an improved system 
of jurisprudence, was only implied in Justice Holmes' comments. 
However, it was expressly recognized that the existing forums 
within which the components of human conflict were addressed 
were inadequate to temper the outcry for change, evolutionary or 
otherwise. His response to the recognition that the American court 
system was no longer sacrosanct and did not embody the ideals of 
jurisprudence suggested that alternative methods of dispute reso-
lution had to be conceived and implemented. 
At the time Holmes spoke, arbitration was an idea whose time 
had not come into existence. Although this process of dispute reso-
t Michigan Regional Director, American Arbitration Association. 
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lution had been existing for millenniums, it was yet to be legiti-
mized in the judicial forum. Due to petty jurisdictional rivalries, 
arbitration was regarded as a form of creeping socialism. The idea 
that people could resolve their day-to-day conflicts with the assis-
tance ofa neutral third party, without the invocation of formal 
legal procedures, appeared to be an "existentialist derivation." 
This "existentialist derivation" has historically been myopically 
defined as a substitute for litigation. The legal lore which charac-
terizes arbitration as a substitute for litigation bears little resem-
blance to the realities of the process. Arbitration is a contractual 
proceeding whereby the parties to a controversy or dispute, select 
judges of their own choice, and by consent, submit their contro-
versy to such· judges for final determination in place of the tribu-
nals provided by the ordinary processes of law. 
These proceedings can be initiated and carried out without 
traditional federal court pleadings. Accordingly, the validity and 
effect of such pleadings do not become important. Presumptions 
and burdens of proof of the law of evidence do not govern. Distinc-
tions between issues of fact and of law, as conceived in the law of 
civil jurisprudence and procedure, have no comparable role in arbi-
tration. Arbitration, in essence, displaces all significant aspects of 
civil litigation except notice and the right to be heard. 
To the process of arbitration, we basically submit those cases 
which do not require the special treatment of the formal judicial 
process. By removing the disputes that can be resolved outside the 
judicial system, those which are only susceptible to judicial treat-
ment are handled more efficaciously by the mechanisms designed 
to embrace them. 
The "existentialist derivation" spoken of earlier was ultimately 
invoked, albeit gradually, to resolve disputes of virtually all types. l 
. 1. In 1982, the following statutory amendments were enacted germane to arbitration: (a) 
The Arizona Arbitration Statute was amended to include arbitration in public works con-
tracts if the amount in controversy is less than one hundred thousand dollars; (b) The Ar-
kansas Uniform Arbitration Act was amended to provide for the arbitration of commercial 
disputes which were previously excluded; (c) The California Arbitration Statute was 
amended to specifically provide for the issuance of subpoenas in connection with these pro-
ceedings; and (d) The New York Arbitration Statute was amended by facilitating the pro-
cess by which an arbitrator could conclude the arbitration process by requiring the arbitra-
tor to affirm a written award instead of merely acknowledging it. 
In the same year, substantial legislation providing for arbitration was enacted: (a) 
Anchorage revised its public sector collective bargaining ordinance. In contract/interest ar-
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Most recently, the process of arbitration was extended to include 
the resolution of patent validity and patent infringement cases. 
The following pages address the historical background and signifi-
cance of this novel legislation as a bellweather of reform in the 
patent industry, the specifics concerning the implementation of the 
Act, and the philosophical considerations which undergird the 
process. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
On August 27, 1982, President Reagan signed into law House 
Resolution No. 6260. The bill provides for voluntary binding arbi-
tration of future and pending disputes over the validity and in-
fringement of patents or patent rights.2 The law went into effect on 
February 27, 1983. The text of the legislation, which amends Title 
35 U.S. Code, is located in the next section of the article. 
Prior to its passage, the judicial system had not been favorably 
disposed toward the utilization of a system other than its own. Al-
though certain aspects of patent disputes had been previously arbi-
trable, courts did not enforce awards pertaining to patent validity 
and infringement, deeming it to be within the exclusive province of 
the courts.8 The rationale advanced by the courts was that a chal-
bitration, final offer arbitration on an issue-by-issue basis is now mandated; (b) The 
Franchise Relations Act, Chapter 5.5 of the Business and Professions Code, provides for 
voluntary binding arbitation of disputes between franchisor and franchisee; (c) In Oregon, a 
law was signed providing for arbitration of a dispute between state agencies, between state 
agencies and local governmental units, and between local governmental units, under the 
auspices of the AAA and subject to its Commercial Rules; (d) In the Virgin Islands, legisla-
tion was enacted to provide for arbitration of disputes arising between public employers and 
their employees. 
2. ..... an issue of validity arises when a party contends that a patent for some reason is 
not valid and therefore is no longer in force and effect. A question of infringement arises 
when parties argue that what they are doing is not covered by the claims of the patent, even 
though the patent is valid." Goldsmith, The Arbitration of Patent Disputes, 34 ARB. J. 28 
(1979). 
3. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Developments Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th 
Cir. 1970); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930). 
Several public policy arguments have been advanced by the courts in their efforts to pre-
clude recognition from being given to arbitration agreements. The first argument is that 
there is an overwhelming interest by the members of the public domain in preserving free 
enterprise. Thus, patent validity and infringement cases should remain part of the public 
record. Since arbitration proceedings are private and confidential, the public interest would 
not be well-served. 
The second public policy argument interposed by the courts is that the arbitrators' in-
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lenge to the validity of a patent is not coterminous with the asser-
tion of rights arising under the supporting agreement; the chal-
lenge is thus tantamount to a repudiation of the agreement. 
Arbitration as a remedy for the resolution of the dispute is incon-
sistent with the repudiation. 
In 1978, the Senate of the 94th Congress passed a bill which 
would have permitted the arbitration of patent disputes. The legis-
lation died where it originated because of various controversial as-
pects. Subsequent years of educating the public and private indus-
try that the traditional system of American jurisprudence cannot 
effectively absorb the administration, utilization and disposition of 
patent disputes bore fruit. By 1982, the resisting forces, the De-
partment of Justice and the Department of Commerce, furnished 
their support to the arbitration process. Thus the patent and 
trademark appropriation bill was swiftly enacted into law. 
The enactment of the legislation represented the culmination of 
years of efforts by the patent bar, private industry, the American 
Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association to make 
all the provisions of the United States Arbitration Act extend to 
embrace all aspects of patent disputes. As with many types of 
commercial transactions, the drafters viewed the legislation as an 
aid to ease court docket congestion.4 
The basis for the legislation is set forth in the House Judiciary 
Committee Report prepared by Representative Kastenmeier. It 
states that "[a]t present, agreements to arbitrate some aspect of 
disputes arising under patent licenses are enforceable by the 
courts; however, there have been court decisions that have disap-
proved arbitration of disputes concerning patent validity or 
infringement. " 
volvement in the industrial mainstream may be too closely linked to the fortunes of the 
patent industry. The added concern is that eventually the two bodies of law may merge into 
a more relaxed standard of case law application. 
Both of the foregoing concerns are dealt with by various safeguards expressly set forth in 
the legislative matrix. For further explanation of these bases, see Hoellering, New Opportu-
nities for Patent Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1982. 
4. In a recent article on. this issue titled, The Arbitration of Patent Disputes, Paul D. 
Carmichael notes that patent litigation has become one of the most time-consuming and 
complex forms of commercial litigation. Like anti-trust disputes, despite the small percent-
age of cases comprising the litigation caseload, the expertise necessary to adjudicate such 
disputes renders the system burdensome. General legal theories play an insignificant role in 
the resolution of patent and copyright disputes. 
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The decisions of the courts, most of which vacillated between 
complete non-recognition of arbitration agreements to tacit accept-
ance of their validity in the marketplace, gave rise to the move-
ment responsible for developing the patent arbitration scheme. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT 
Section 35 U.S.C. 294, sub-section (a) states: 
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a 
provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity 
or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a pro-
vision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute 
may agree in writing to settle such disputes by arbitration. Any such pro-
vision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except for 
any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract.6 
This section permits judicial recognition, heretofore sanctioned in 
other areas of arbitral jurisprudence,e of present and future dis-
pute resolution. The significance of this language is that the par-
ties to a licensure agreement may not only contract in advance for 
their preferred method of dispute resolution, but if not contem-
plated at the time of contract execution, the parties may, at the 
time the dispute actually arises, submit their dispute to arbitra-
tion. This suggests the complete acceptance of the arbitration pro-
cess and its viability in patent validity and infringement dispute 
resolution. 
The agreement to arbitrate, as with all agreements to arbitrate, 
5. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1982). 
6. The primary distinction between present and future dispute resolution is that the 
latter is deemed valid and irrevocable even though the parties change their minds regarding 
the viability of the submission of the dispute to arbitration. This distinction effectively 
translates into the distinction between common law and statutory arbitration. The arbitra-
tion statute which is well grounded in common law vestiges does not recognize the validity 
of future dispute resolution and thereby reduces the element of certainty which otherwise 
attaches to third party dispute resolution. The differences between common law and statu-
tory arbitration also includes the composition and election of the arbitral board, the conduct 
of the hearing, and matters relating to enforcement and implementation of the award. In 
common law arbitration, these procedures are, by and large, governed by judge-made com-
mon law rules. While statutory arbitration prescribes formalities, and requires a written 
submission of the dispute in controversy, at common law it has been held that even an oral 
agreement and a subsequently rendered oral award are adequate. In either common law or 
statutory arbitration, the award can be disturbed in the event of fraud, misconduct, partial-
ity of the arbitration, gross unfairness of the proceedings, want of excess of jurisdiction in 
the arbitration or a substantial breach of a common law rule. 
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may be challenged by asserting typical defenses to contract forma-
tion: fraud in the inducement, fraud in the factum, mutual mis-
take, rescission, etc. 
Sub-section (b) states: 
Arbitration of such disputes, awards by arbitrators and confirmation of 
awards shall be governed by Title 9, United States Code, to the extent 
such title is not inconsistent with this section. In any such arbitration 
proceeding, the defenses provided for under section 282 of this title shall 
be considered by the arbitrator if raised by any party to the proceeding.7 
The defenses in an action involving the validity or infringement 
of a patent must be formally pleaded. Such defenses include: 
1. Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, or 
unenforceability. 
2. Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in 
part II of this title as a condition for patentability. 
3. Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with 
any requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title. 
4. Any other fact or act made a defense by this title. 
Thus the arbitrator would be able to rule on the validity of such 
defenses. Since arbitrators are generally considered to be creatures 
of contract, such an express grant of authority should preclude 
frivolous or promiscuous allegations of procedural arbitrability 
from being raised. 
Sub-section (c) states: 
An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties 
to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person. 
The parties to an arbitration may agree that in the event a patent which 
is the subject matter of an award is subsequently determined to be inva-
lid or unenforceable in a judgment rendered by a court of competent ju-
risdiction from which no appeal can or has been taken, such award may 
be modified by any court of competent jurisdiciton upon application by 
any party to the arbitration. Any such modification shall govern the 
rights and obligations between such parties from the date of such 
modification.8 
The first sentence of this section states the obvious of arbitral 
jurisprudence that only the parties to the actual contract can be 
affected or governed by the arbitrator's award. The language is si-
7. 35 U.S.C. § 294(b) (1982). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c) (1982). 
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lent on whether non-parties can be added to the arbitration pro-
ceeding vis a vis the consent of all the existing parties. However, 
given the state of the law on the enforceability of an award to in-
clude such a configuration, it is likely that such an agreement 
would be given effect. 
Third parties are authorized to contest the validity of a patent 
in court or by an independent arbitration proceeding even though 
the patent has been deemed valid in a prior arbitration proceeding. 
It is premature to assess the impact of two potentially inconsistent 
decisions concerning the identical subject matter of a dispute as 
contemplated by the language allowing for appeal of an arbitrator's 
decision as there have been no reported awards and decisions in 
this area as of this writing. 
In the final sentence of sub-section (c), a patent may be held 
valid in arbitration, but may subsequently be challenged in court. 
If overturned, there can be no further appeal. The language sug-
gests that the binding element of arbitration has been disturbed 
somewhat as the licensee is not estopped from contesting the valid-
ity of the patent.9 This language was evidently inserted to allay the 
public's fears that failure to furnish a limited method of appellate 
recourse would render the system completely unfavorable to poten-
tial users. Despite the limitations of the appellate process, it is axi-
omatic that parties generally believe justice can only be achieved 
by providing an opportunity to exhaust all avenues of recourse. 
Sub-section (d) states: 
When an award is made by an arbitrator, the patentee, his assignee or 
licensee shall give notice thereof in writing to the commissioner. There 
shall be a separate notice prepared for each patent involved in such pro-
ceedings. Such notice shall set forth the names and addresses of the par-
ties, the name of the inventor, and the name of the patent owner, shall 
designate the number of the patent, and shall contain a copy of the 
award. If an award is modified by a court, the party requesting such 
modification shall give notice of such modification to the commissioner. 
The commissioner shall, upon receipt of either notice, enter the same in 
the record of the prosecution of such patent. If the required notice is not 
filed with the commisssioner any party to the proceeding may provide 
such notice to the commissioner.'o 
The import of this language is that notice to the Commissioner 
9. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 294(d) (1982). 
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of Patents and Trademarks becomes a requirement, and the re-
sults of the arbitration proceedings, unlike most proceedings where 
strict confidentiality of identities and results prevail, will become 
part of the public record. l1 
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CORNERSTONES OF ARBITRATION 
Albeit the origins of arbitration can be traced to 700 B.C. in the 
Athenian culture, it was not until the Middle Ages that any philo-
sophical perspectives regarding the process were extensively re-
corded. In his article entitled, "The Anglo-Saxon Courts of Law, 
Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law," Adams describes the Anglo-Saxon 
view of arbitration: 
In a society which has no confidence either in its judges, its judicial pro-
cess, or its very law itself,-which could devise no system of reform in 
the practice, nor of equitable protection against the evils of that law,-it 
was certainly not surprising that men should seek a remedy outside the 
public tribunals. 
Since antiquity, the resolution of human conflict and the per-
ceived ineffectiveness of the standard judicial machinery has domi-
nated dialogue in many forums. Arbitration has today come to as-
sume a supplemental role to that of litigation. Proponents of the 
process proselytize it as a viable alternative, preferring it to the 
11. The Patent and Trademark office, acting in a rule-making capacity, has published 
the following rule regarding notice of arbitration awards: 
Written notice of any award by an arbitrator pursuant to 35 USC 294 must be 
filed in the patent and trademark office by the patentee, or the patentee's assignee 
of licensee. If the award involves more than one patent, a separate notice must be 
filed for placement in each patent. The notice must set forth the patent number, 
the names of the inventor and patent owner, and the names and addresses of the 
parties to the arbitration. The notice must also include a copy of the award. 
If an award by an arbitrator pursuant to 35 USC 294 is modified by a court, the 
party requesting the modification must file in the patent and trademark office a 
notice of the modification for placement in each patent to which the modification 
applies. The notice must set forth the patent number, the names of the inventor 
and patent owner, and the names and addresses of the parties to the arbitration. 
The notice must also include a copy of the court's order modifying the award. 
Any award by an arbitrator pursuant to 35 USC 294 shall be unenforceable un-
til any notices required by paragraph a or b of this section are filed in the patent 
and trademark office. If any required notice is not filed by the party designated in 
paragraph a or b of this section, any party to the arbitration proceeding may file 
such a notice. . 
37 C.F.R. § 1.335 (1982). 
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legal polytechnics which occupy the litigation sphere. Its prefer-
ence is advanced due to its speed, lack of expense, and ability to 
provide adequate equities. 
The salutary benefits of recognizing the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements in patent and copyright cases are multifarious. 
Due to the extremely technical nature of patent cases, the time 
consumed by litigating such cases is enormous. This situation is 
exacerabated by two factors: a) the participants must adhere to the 
strict application of the formal rules of procedure and evidence, 
and b) the participants must be prepared to "educate" the judge or 
jury on the dynamics of the industry. 
Expeditious closure of disputes is a by-product of the new arbi-
tration system. Antediluvian formal rules of code pleading need 
not be adhered to. The issues do not have to be extensively ampli-
fied, nor do the arguments have to be detailed. 
The award of the arbitration panel must be issued within sixty 
days from hearing closure; the research required by the arbitrator 
subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing will be minimal. 
Arbiters who hear and dispose of these cases are selected from 
the patent bar; their particular skill and expertise preclude the 
need to brief the panelists regarding the industrial facets. This as-
pect affects not only the speed within which such cases are dis-
posed of but, concomitantly reduces the cost of administering and 
arbitrating them. 
The arbitration system thus combines the expertise of the spe-
cialist with the efficiency of tailored arbitration procedures 
designed to dispose of the cases more expeditiously than if they 
were litigated. 
As a matter of public policy, arbitration has long had the sup-
port of the judiciary. The ancient common law hostility concerning 
the non-arbitrability of certain types of cases has now substantially 
dissipated, particularly in view of this new legislation. The House 
resolution authorizing the arbitration of patent disputes does not 
in any way limit the authority of an arbitrator to render decisions 
which are just, fair and conclusive on all of the issues submitted 
for consideration. According to the law, the arbitrator is vested 
with the same type of authority as a judge; the arbitrator can make 
determinations upon inferences and priority-conception, dili-
gence, reduction to practice, ownership of inventions or title, roy-
alty contracts, royalty rates and also interpret claim language. The 
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arbitrator is thus relatively unencumbered in his efforts to formu-
late or fashion appropriate remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
In a recent address to the members of the judiciary, Justice Bur-
ger noted 
[t]he obligation of our profession is, or has long been thought to be, to 
serve as healers of human conflicts. To fulfill our traditional obligation 
means that we should provide mechanisms that can produce an accept-
able result in the shortest possible time, with the least possible expense, 
and with a minimum of stress on the participants. That is what justice is 
all about. 
Through a philosophically more credible modality, the Patent 
and Trademark Appropriations Bill enables those engaged in 
human conflict to more expeditiously and responsibly resolve their 
differences. This system of justice need not supplant our present 
system of jurisprudence; it can effectively complement the tradi-
tional adversarial system. The new law encourages the use of a via-
ble process, a process which resolves real problems in a manner 
consistent with the time-honored concept of voluntary choice. 
